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PRIVACY, COPYRIGHT, AND LETTERS
JEFFREY L. HARRISON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this article is the privacy of letters-the written mani-
festations of thoughts, intents, and the recollections of facts directed to
a person or a narrowly defined audience.' The importance of this pri-
vacy is captured in the novel Atonement' by Ian McEwen and in the film
based on the novel.3 The fulcrum from which the action springs is a
letter that is read by someone to whom it was not addressed.4 The
result is literally life-changing, even disastrous for a number of charac-
ters. One person dies, two people seemingly meant for each other are
torn apart, and a family is left in shambles.' This example is, of course,
drawn from fiction but there is no doubt that it is a case of art imitating
life. It is hard to imagine someone who has not been affected in one
way or another by the reading of a message by someone for whom it
was not intended.
Is this an appropriate topic for a conference that is at least focused
in part on the impact of technological advances? In order to answer
that, consider this statement:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for secur-
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law
'I am grateful to Elon University School of Law and the organizers of the Elon Law
Review's 2011 Symposium for giving me an opportunity to participate.
2 IAN McEWEN, ATONEMENT (Nan A. Talese 2001).
3 ATONEMENT (Universal Studios 2008).
The letter is from one lover to another and contained the following: "In my dreams
I kiss your cunt, your sweet wet cunt. In my thoughts I make love to yot all day."
McEWEN, supra note 2, at 80. As it turns out the letter writer mistakenly sent the letter,
thinking he had sent a less provocative one. It was, however, read by a party for whom it
was not intended. Id. at 125.
5 McEWEN, supra note 2.
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ing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone."
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprises have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."6
In the spirit of "so what else is new?" some readers may recognize
this passage. It is from the classic article by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, The Right to Pivacy, published in 1890.1 New technology is a
relative concept and always exists. It is a function of what came before
and almost all the questions we face today are no different in kind
from those that started when humans began writing on cave walls.8
This is not to say the magnitude of the issues or ways it is to be
addressed are the same. Well before mass copying was possible, the
writers and intended recipients of letters had some chance of control-
ling who read their letters. A letter existing in a single copy could be
burned or shredded or at least secreted away. Nothing rivals the In-
ternet with respect to the potential for instant and massive dissemina-
tion. A message can be available to millions of unintended readers
within seconds and one's fortunes altered just as quickly.
A great deal of law as it relates to the privacy of letters has evolved
in the context of copyright law under a fair use analysis.9 In this article
I argue that focus on copyright and letters detracts from examining the
real character of letters and the interests to be protected, and that pri-
vacy interests10 should be put at the forefront. In fact, I argue letters
6 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pivacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890).
1 Id. See generally Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy and
the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of
Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 703 (1990). For a
discussion of very early cases, see MORRIs L. ERNST & AIAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE
RIGHT To BE LEFr ALONE, 24-43 (Macmillan 1962).
8 For a recent discussion of privacy and copyright issues in the context of e-mail, see
Ned Snow, A Copyright Conundrum: Protecting Email Pivacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 501
(2007).
9 Under a fair use analysis, a use of a work that would otherwise be an infringement
is not if the use passes a four step analysis that weighs the nature of the use, the nature
of the copied work, the amount used, and the impact of the use on the value of the
original. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). For a review of how fair use has been employed in the
context of letters see Benjamin Ely Marks, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair
Use Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376 (1997).
10 As discussed below, the protection of privacy is viewed here as a means to an end.
That end is "peace of mind" or a decrease in the anxiety that one's expressions in
letters will be revealed to others. It is not the end of protecting one's earning power.
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should not be copyrighted at all. Copyright is fundamentally about
encouraging the production of works by allowing authors to internal-
ize the benefits of those works. In the context of copyright law, privacy
is really something to be avoided. In stark terms the issue might be
thought of like this: If we assume our thoughts are private, is there any
policy interest in changing that status once we record them in tangible
form in order to communicate with specified others. This turns less on
copyright policy than it does on the rightful privacy expectations of
letter writers.
Before focusing on these themes, I want to make one observation
and refine what I mean by privacy for purposes of this article. The first
point involves the irony of technology as it relates to information.
Maybe the most outstanding and beneficial aspect of the Internet is
the reduction of transaction costs." Information of all kinds can be
found in seconds, thus lowering search costs and making markets
more competitive and education less expensive. The transaction cost
reducing impact of the Internet is not all for the good. While mutually
beneficial transactions are less expensive," there are a host of activities
that are not beneficial to both parties which are also less expensive. In
effect, technology has raised the costs of protecting privacy and reset
the cost benefit analysis. Technology unlocks windows and doors and
lowers the costs of those who want to bypass the market altogether. It
forces us to reconsider how much privacy to which one is entitled.
When it comes to privacy, I am referring to the desire of individu-
als for the peace of mind associated with knowing that information
and expressions they do not want disclosed will not be disclosed. In a
recent comprehensive analysis, Daniel J. Solove identifies a number of
ways in which privacy can be viewed, ranging from issues raised by sur-
veillance to blackmail." Using his classification system, the interests
here are "disclosure" 4 and, to some extent, "intrusion."'5 According to
" Transaction costs in normal usage are the costs of an exchange. They do not refer
to the actual cost of the item exchanged but search costs, drafting expenses, and the
like. When transaction costs exceed the benefits of the exchange an otherwise produc-
tive exchange does not take place. For example, the principle function of eBay is to
lower transaction costs. The notion of transaction cost can be extended to other re-
source reallocations. For example, burglar alarms raise the cost of theft.
12 Lowering transaction costs is comparable to reducing friction.
1- Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. Rrv. 477 (2006). See also
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. RE.v. 1087 (2002).
14 Solove, supra note 13, at 530.
15 Id. at 552.
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Solove, disclosure occurs when "true information about a person is re-
vealed to others."' 6 Intrusion, on the other hand, is involvement in
another person's life sufficient to cause him to alter his activities.17 Al-
though intrusion refers to inserting one's self into the life of another,'8
the disclosure of information is also likely to have the potential to be
activity altering.
The theme of this article is also derived from the classic 1890 War-
ren and Brandeis article quoted above. In that article they identify a
right "to be let alone." 9 In particular, the authors focus on letters20
and observe that where the value of production is found not in the
right to take the profits arising from publication, but in the peace of
mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at
all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common
acceptation of that term.2 '
Perhaps more importantly, the privacy interest as envisioned here
extends beyond that expressed in traditional tort law. For example,
under the Restatement Second of Torts, Section 652A, a privacy inter-
est is invaded when there is "unreasonable publicity given to the
other's private life, as stated in 652D."22 Under 652D an invasion oc-
curs when [o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern
to the public.23
In particular, "peace of mind" as employed here means more than
simply being protected from disclosures that would be highly offensive.
On the other hand, as described here, there is a limit to privacy when
non-disclosure would mean the likelihood that an important right of
others is endangered. For example, a letter in which the writer ex-
presses an intent to cause another bodily harm could be disclosed.
16 Id. at 531.
17 See id. at 553.
18 See id.
"9 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 195.
20 Id. at 201.
21 Id. at 200-01.
22 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
23 Id. § 652D.
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More technically, this can be viewed as a "harm to others defense."2 4
One can view this as a balancing of interests. Although the value of
peace of mind to the letter writer is valued, so is the peace of mind of
the potential victim of harmful acts.
II. LETTERS ARE DIFFERENT
There are a number of ways that personal letters differ from works
ordinarily protected by copyright law. The first difference is part of an
underlying imperfection in the application of copyright law generally.
It is undisputable that American copyright law, 5 apart from some
rights afforded the creator of visual works, 26 is not about protecting
moral rights.2 7 It is based on an underlying utilitarian rationale." The
author is permitted to internalize the benefits of his or her work as a
means of benefitting the public by producing that work. The United
States Supreme Court has viewed it as a contract between the public
and the author.2 The public gives up something-access to the
work-in exchange for the author's efforts to produce what one hopes
will be enriching to the public. In effect, the author has exclusive
rights for a limited period of time that may be sold.30 Underlying the
24 The actual importance of this exception may be quite small. General knowledge
that threats or other harmful intents may be disclosed will only discourage putting
those feelings in letters.
25 Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact laws
pertaining to copyright, provides that the power is "[tlo promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 The Visual Artists Rights Act protects the creators of certain types of works from
misattributions and destruction of those works under specific circumstances. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A (2006).
27 See generally Dana L. Burton, Comment, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 639 (1995).
28 This has been expressed repeatedly by the Court. In Fox Films Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932),Justice Hughes wrote "[t]he sole interest of the United States . . .
in conferring [a copyright] liels] in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors." Similarly Justice Douglas expressed, "[t]he copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the [author] a secondary consideration." United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). Finally in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003), the Court assessed the rationality of a copyright term extension by
reference to incentives for authors. As noted in the text, however, the Court likely
imagined incentives where none existed.
29 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214.
30 See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 CoLuM. L. Ri.v. 983, 1003-
04 (1970). Currently, for works produced on or afterJanuary 1, 1978, this period be-
gins when the work is fixed and extends for the life of the author plus seventy years. 17
U.S.C § 302(a) (2006).
Elon Law Review
law is the belief that the copyright incentive leads to the creation of
various types of work.3 ' At least ideally this means that there should be
something akin to a proximate cause relationship between the produc-
tion of a work and the anticipated award.
The problem is that a great number of "works" are created with-
out the expectation of gain by virtue of copyright.32 Letters are a
prime example. One person writing to another hardly has the income
in mind that will accrue once he or she can sell the "rights" to the
letter. In short, it is unlikely that personal letters need copyright pro-
tection in order to come into existence. Indeed, the fact that they may
become public through a fair use analysis may even limit their use and
raise the cost of communication to those who value their peace of
mind. In this respect, the proximate cause notion may work in reverse.
Due to fair use possibilities, letters may not be relied upon as a mode
of communication. In short, there is simply a disconnect between the
purpose of copyright and the existence of these works.3 3
This disconnect between copyright and letters is similar to the
"logic" found in the Court's relatively recent opinion in Eldred4 in
which it considered the retroactive extension of copyright duration.
There the Court reasoned that works created before the extension
were motivated by the expectation of authors decades earlier that if the
period of copyright were extended, they would be the beneficiaries.3 5
Obviously this connection is very doubtful.3 6
31 See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206 ("The CTEA may also provide greater incentive for
American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United
States."); Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158 ("It is said that reward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.").
32 New styles in clothes are not copyrightable but appear nonetheless each season as
producers strive to increase profit. No doubt, numerous poems are written and photo-
graphs taken without a thought about copyright and internalization made possible by
virtue of copyright.
33 Typically a proximate cause analysis involves the connection between an action and
an eventual consequence. In the case of copyright, the analysis runs in the opposite
direction. Does the existence of a possible gain give rise to the creativity? When it does
not, the financial gain is unnecessary. In effect, copyright is not the proximate cause of
the creativity.
34 537 U.S. at 186.
35 Id. at 214-15.
36 Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion is very helpful in this regard. See id. at 254
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more
than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the
copyright extension to matter.").
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A second element of letters that makes them different is that the
writer typically has little interest in having his or her work exposed to a
greater audience. A letter is not a work in the sense that the author
desires to express publicly some emotion. In fact, the author may want
it exposed to no one but the intended recipient or may be indifferent
to whoever sees it and whether that exposure results in any income.
Indeed, letters are similar to most other copyrighted works merely by
virtue of the fact that they are fixed writings.37
A third element that makes letters different from other copy-
righted works is that the concern of a letter writer is not that the work
will be copied but that it will be read. The writer who has concerns
about his letters being exposed to others is indifferent as to whether
1,000 copies are made of the letter and read by 1,000 people or 1,000
people read the original letter. 8 Put differently, the information is
what counts here and not what is generally protected by copyright
law-the expression. Thus, unlike the film production company or the
book publisher who is injured by virtue of lost sales if bootleg copies
are made, there is no usurpation of a market the letter writer expected
to exploit. In short, the letter writer is concerned that secrets not be
revealed regardless of whether copying has occurred.
To be sure, the Copyright Act also protects the author from unau-
thorized public performance and public display of literary works." Re-
citing is included in the definition of performance. 40 Thus, reading a
letter publically would be an infringement. Unfortunately, the Copy-
right Act does not directly define "work" but, as discussed above, the
central argument here is that something should not be a "work" for
copyright purposes unless it is drawn forth by the implicit bargain be-
tween the public and the author.
There is another way in which letters differ from most other copy-
righted works. They typically are labeled in a way that someone com-
ing upon a letter knows whether or not he or she has been authorized
to read it. Much like a wrapped gift, the label "to" is like the salutation
"dear" and makes the writer's intent clear. There are analogies to this
in other areas of law. For example, in contract law an offer may only
be accepted by the person or persons to whom the offer was made. So
37 Fixation is a necessary but not sufficient reason for a work to be copyrighted.
38 This distinction may seem minor but could be the key in a First Amendment analy-
sis. See notes 57 & 58 infra.
3 17 U.S.C § 106 (2006).
40 17 U.S.C § 101 (2006).
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too with a letter, the writer of the letter can be viewed as the only
person who may designate who the reader is to be.4 1
Although the argument here is that letters should not be copy-
rightable, there is an important analogy in copyright law itself. For this
purpose, it is important to note a distinction between ownership of a
letter and the use of a letter. When one party sends a letter to another
there seems to be little doubt that the recipient owns the physical let-
ter. That does not necessarily mean that the person owns the right to
the work." In the case of a letter, there is no reason to think the trans-
mission of the information therein carries with it an expectation that
the same information will be further transmitted or read by someone
other than the recipient.
A final distinction concerns remedies. The standard infringement
remedy is damages plus the disgorgement of profits.43 Injunctive relief
and statutory damages are available," but the theme is that there is a
monetary substitute for the loss of control of one's work. The courts
go to extraordinary lengths to determine the amounts due to the au-
thor whose work has been infringed.45 The assumption, though, is that
what has been taken is an income earning asset.46 The valuation of the
embarrassment or sense of violation that occurs when one's letters are
published is a far cry from what copyright remedies envision. In fact,
there may be no monetary equivalent to those losses. The possibility of
putting the person in the position he or she would have been in may
be lost forever.4 7
41 This may resolve the problem of the unintended recipient. In the novel Atonement,
the wrong letter was sent and read by someone for whom it was not intended. A com-
mon problem that seems to occur regularly with electronic communications is sending
the right letter to the wrong person. For example, a writer may intend to reply to one
person and accidently click on "reply to all." Or, the writer may rely on a preexisting
list of addressees and use the wrong one. A position consistent with the views expressed
here is that the unintended recipient should not, out of respect for the privacy of the
writer (a respect the recipient would like if the roles were reversed), read the message if
the mistake is obvious.
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
4 17 U.S.C § 504 (2006).
4 Id. § 502 (injunctive relief); id. § 504(c) (statutory damages).
45 See, e.g., Frank Music Corp. v. MGM Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989).
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (authorizing the copyright owner to recover profits from the
infringer "attributable to the infringement").
47 This is not to say that copyright remedies have the same goal as contract or tort
remedies. Instead, the goal seems to be to discourage those who would claim to engage
in an "efficient infringement." See infra note 88.
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The point thus far is that there is little or no connection between
the purposes of copyright law and the privacy and peace of mind of the
letter writer. An approach to copyright law that is true to the Enabling
Provisions of the Constitution would result in the disqualification of
letters as copyrightable works.
There remain a few loose ends to tie up. The fact that letters
should not be copyrightable does not mean there is no value in pro-
tecting them. That is a different question. Indeed, some of the argu-
ments against copyright protection actually highlight the reasons for
protecting letters. For example, protecting letters under a privacy the-
ory may encourage freer expression of one's innermost feelings.
The second caveat is that some literary works may take the form of
a letter. For example, a general communication may begin with the
familiar "Dear ." Perhaps the best example of this possibility
is Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail."48 The letter,
although addressed to a number of fellow clergymen, seems hardly to
have been intended to be kept secret or intended only for the eyes of
the recipients. 49 This is not to say that the work qualifies for copyright
protection. It seems indisputable that Dr. King's motivations were
hardly the consequence of some distant belief that there were financial
awards to be internalized. The point is that the assessment of whether
a writing is a letter is a question of substance rather than form.
An additional loose end follows this pattern. As a young person,
one creates a number of works that are at the time irrelevant in terms
of market value. Years, perhaps decades, later the same person be-
comes a celebrity. Publishers and, in particular, biographers are inter-
ested in the earlier works. The writer, or his or her estate, 0 may try to
claim the newfound value of those works. This effort to recapture
profit by way of copyight for works that had no value even to the writer
but for subsequent events is a windfall and unrelated to benefits that
may accrue to the public. On the other hand, the writer's privacy in-
terest does not vary with the new celebrity. The value to others may
increase and the writer may sell the right for a higher price, but the
desire for peace of mind was important to the author well before in-
truding upon it became important to others. In effect, the desire for
8 Martin Luther King,Jr., Letter from Birminghamjail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 85 (Sig-
net Classics 2000).
4 Id. (addressing the letter to "My Dear Fellow Clergymen," but noting that the text
of the letter has been polished "for publication").
5 Of course, the peace of mind interest may end with the death of the letter writer.
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peace of mind is likely to be independent of the newfound celebrity
even though outside intrusions may increase dramatically.
The issue of the use of letters by others often comes up in the
context of a fair use analysis.51 Fair use is a defense to what would
otherwise be regarded as a copyright infringement.5 2 It is a subjective
four-step analysis that focuses primarily on the purpose of the use and
the financial consequences to the author.53 The outcome of the analy-
sis is marked by uncertainty and, perhaps, some circularity.5 4 Moreo-
ver, when it comes to letters, the issue of whether fair use extends to
unpublished works whether intended for eventual publication or not is
a complicated one. Taking personal letters out of copyright would re-
duce this uncertainty for those who wish to communicate their
thoughts and intents to others but cannot be sure when those works
might become available to all simply because at some time in the fu-
ture the writer is the focus of historians and gossips.
III. COPYRIGHT RELIANCE AND THE COST OF ELIMINATING COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR LETTERS
The case made thus far is that personal letters do not match the
policy goals of copyright. The problem is that secret-keepers may tend
to rely on copyright for a purpose that is the opposite of their inten-
tion. Indeed one could argue that eliminating copyright protection
for letters does mean that biographers and historians would have ac-
cess to letters in order to create important and profitable copyright-
able works.
The empirical question is how much letter writers have come to
rely on copyright protection when they record their thoughts in a tan-
gible medium. Although the uncertainty of the fair use analysis would
suggest this reliance would be foolish, it remains a possibility. If this
possibility exists, then a known lack of copyright protection raises the
cost of keeping secrets to those inclined to do so. Presumably, secret
keepers will devise new ways of concealment, including not recording
5' See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); Sonali R.
Kolhatkar, Comment, Yesterday's Love Letters are Today's Best Sellers: Fair Use & the War
Among Authors, 18J. MAR.SHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 141 (1999); Marks, supra note 9.
52 Marks, supra note 9, at 1377.
5 Id. at 1377-78.
54 One step of the analysis requires an assessment of the impact of the use on the
value of the author's original work. The impact on the value though involves an assess-
ment of what the author owns. And what the author owns cannot be truly determined
without a fair use analysis.
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their thoughts at all.55 In the long run, this means a lower "supply" of
letters. This would make biographers, historians, and, most impor-
tantly, the general public worse off. From this perspective, copyright,
if viewed as a form of privacy right, actually may have achieved in the
case of letters, in a roundabout way, what the Framers seemed to
desire.
All in all, this negative possibility seems slight at best. It would
suggest that, let's say, a letter writer preparing to record his thoughts,
like the young author in Atonement, records his or her thoughts with
the idea in mind that "no one will know what is here because this is
copyrighted." Prior to the last quarter of the Twentieth Century this
would require the author to be knowledgeable on matters of what is
publication and whether or not notice and recordation were required
to protect his or her interest.56 Moreover, the level of protection with
regard to facts, ideas, and theories would have to be understood5 7 as
well as the breadth of fair use. In short, although possible in theory,
the lack of copyright protection seems unlikely to stem the flow of pri-
vate communications.
IV. PRIVACY AND PERSONAL LETTERS
A. The Problem
If we strip the issue of letters to its essence, it is a question of
whether people have a right to control access to their thoughts, intents,
or perceptions of facts.58 If they do, what difference does it make that
those same things can be found in a written form and addressed to
identifiable others? This section addresses that question and discusses
issues that can arise. The key point here is that letters are more prop-
erly viewed in the context of the right to personal autonomy and not in
the context of property rights as reflected in the copyright laws. This is
an important distinction. Copyright and even basic property law can
be viewed as based on the idea of internalization. Privacy is quite dif-
ferent. The question becomes: To what extent are individuals entitled
55 The idea that one does not write what he or she wants to be kept secret is hardly a
novel one. As stated by one person who recently confided in this author: never put in
writing what you would not want to see on the front page of The New York Times. Ironi-
cally, the advice was a perversion of the more ethical saying that one should not do what
he would not want reported on the front page of The New York Times.
56 Post-1977, works are protected when fixed as opposed to when published.
57 These are not subject to protection.
58 At one point in copyright this could hinge on whether the letter was regarded as
published and whether it was recorded and included copyright notice.
1712012]
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not to have their thoughts exposed to others when there is no internal-
ization goal?59 Of course, protection of any right is but a means to an
end. In this case, the focus is on affording the letter writer the "peace
of mind" that what is not intended to be public will not become public.
This idea was captured some time ago by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis. In their classic 1890 article, they wrote:
What is the nature, the basis, of this right to prevent the publication of
manuscripts or works of art? It is stated to be the enforcement of a right
of property; and no difficulty arises in accepting this view, so long as we
have only to deal with the reproduction of literary and artistic composi-
tions. They certainly possess many of the attributes of ordinary property:
they are transferable; they have a value; and publication or reproduction
is a use by which that value is realized. But where the value of the produc-
tion is found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication,
but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property,
in the common acceptation of that term.60
Warren and Brandeis argue that the protection in the case of letters
rests not on the ownership of property, which would be more consis-
tent with copyright,' but in the notion of the right to privacy." To-
day's letter writers, to the extent they are concerned at all, are no less
concerned about privacy. In fact, they have more to fear. The letter
writer, as opposed to the traditional author for copyright purposes, is
more similar to the homeowner who keeps his blinds drawn or closes
the door. Indeed, the more appropriate analogy may be to Fourth
Amendment rights and expectations of privacy.
B. The Legitimacy of a Right to Privacy in Letters
Although Warren and Brandeis distinguish property rights from
privacy rights, it is not clear that the distinction is all that sharp. In
either case, the key idea is that of "a right to exclusivity," however la-
beled. The larger question is whether that ight should exist at all.
There are a number of ways to argue that this is the case, albeit some
ways more convincing than others. One is based on the Lockean, or
5 Often those who consider the question of privacy and letters view copyright law, in
one form or another, as the logical starting point. See Snow, supra note 8; see also
Kolhatkar, supra note 51.
6 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 200-01 (footnotes omitted).
61 Under current copyright law, the owner of the letter has the right to grant it to
someone else or to sell it. This means, along with other factors, that those who rely on
copyright as a means of promoting secrecy are likely to be disappointed.
62 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 200-05.
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natural law, notion of property rights."3 Locke argues that property
rights originate with the right to the fruits of one's labor." When this
labor is combined with something taken from the state of nature, a
property right is created. 5 In effect, whatever the product of this com-
bination, it cannot be taken by another without also taking the labor of
the originator.
This rationale can be seen as applying equally or even to a greater
extent to privacy. One's thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of facts
are no less self-generated than one's labor. "Taking" someone's privacy
can be seen as an intrusion into the autonomy of the individual. What
is appealing about this approach is that it avoids some of the criticisms
of the Lockean method. For example, in the case of property rights
one might ask why it is that an individual has a right to the entire value
of the property created as opposed to simply the value added by la-
bor.66 When it comes to one's peace of mind, nothing is combined
with what exists in a state of nature. Quibbles about value added and
the person's entitlement to anything other than value added make lit-
tle sense.
Another approach borrows from Rawls67 and asks how people be-
hind the veil of ignorance would define privacy and one's rights when
it comes to letters.68 Behind the veil, decision makers would not know
if they would be secret keepers or those interested in the secrets of
others when they step from behind the veil. 69 Obviously, Rawls wrote
in terms of general principles but underlying his analysis is an assump-
tion that people would be risk averse. 0 In the case of the privacy of
letters the question is how rights would be assigned before the parties
know what will be in their self interest. The answer, of course, is not
knowable, but the risk-averse position is likely to be one in which the
63 SeeJoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 307 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960).
64 Id. at 306.
65 Id.
66 Robert Nozick makes the point that someone dumping a can of tomatojuice in the
ocean so that it spreads throughout the ocean would not be regarded as laying claim to
the ocean. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-75 (194); see also Edwin
C. Hettinger, justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 31, 38 (1989).
67 SeeJoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971).
68 See id. at 136-42.
69 See id.
70 This is most evident in Rawls' "Difference Principle." Social and economic ine-
qualities are to be arranged so that they are both "(a) reasonably expected to be to
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all." Id. at 53.
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parties choose to be protected from embarrassment as opposed to be-
ing forced to take affirmative steps to protect against intrusions that
may be life-changing, increasingly expensive, and of varying degrees of
certainty. Indeed, uncertainty may be the key. Behind the veil, the
uncertainty of negative events is likely to be treated as something to be
avoided.
Two other approaches have utilitarian underpinnings. The first
asks who values the right more. The question might be posed in terms
of who owns the right to the contents of letters once written and trans-
mitted. The idea under this alternative is to imagine a right that can
be defined in two ways. Under one version, one is assured of the pri-
vacy of personal letters. Under the other version, no such assurance is
available and the right is a "right to read." Those familiar with the
Coase Theorem' and externalities will recognize this as an instance of
competing uses, only the resource involved is far less tangible than the
rights to air, sun or water. Here, those seeking privacy could be viewed
as giving rise to an externality with respect to those who desire infor-
mation. Those attempting to acquire information could be viewed as
creating an externality for those who want to be left alone. Conse-
quently, the question can be posed in terms of who has the right to use
the "privacy space."
In a sense, this is a single right that can be owned by one group or
another. The problem is how one defines the default position or who
owns the right initially. One could take a utilitarian perspective and
define the right in a way that maximizes utility. The problem, as with
all utilitarian-based policy prescriptions, is that an interpersonal com-
parison of utility is not possible.
A related approach would be to define the right or assign its own-
ership on the basis of who values it the most. One can envision an
auction with competing parties-privacy seekers and "right to read"
proponents-bidding for their preferred version of the right. This ap-
proach has some appeal and may in some respects reflect reality, in
that people currently do invest in efforts to both protect their privacy
and to discover information about others.72 Still, there is a serious
71 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); see generally
JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND EcoNoMics 81-101 (2008).
2A]ix Vance, The Digital Universe, Information Shadows, and Paying for Privacy, THE
SCHOLARLY KITCHEN, May 17, 2010, http://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2010/05/17/
the-digital-universe-information-shadows-and-paying-for-privacy.
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question of whether one's privacy should be contingent on the ability
to pay for it. In fact, the problem here is not unlike that which arises
under the Fourth Amendment in which privacy is clearly a function of
income. In that context, there seems to be little dispute that money
and wealth mean greater privacy.73 The same is likely to be true with
respect to communications-those who can afford different means of
communication and devices that assist in protecting privacy are af-
forded greater peace of mind.74 In effect, this economic solution, if it
could be determined, just gives rise to the normative question of
whether rights should be determined by economic means.
The second economic approach, "Pareto Superior," has its roots
in Kant's Categorical Imperative.7 5 Reallocations are Pareto Superior
when at least one party is better off and no one is worse off.7 6 The
problem is that in a regime in which privacy rights like those consid-
ered here do not exist, it is difficult to describe the person whose let-
ters are read by those for whom they were not intended as "worse off."
Without a consensus with respect to what it means to be better or
worse off, which itself must be based on legitimate expectations, a
Paretian analysis does not advance the overall analysis.
In sum, although the issue is not free from doubt, there are good
arguments that there should be an expansive right to keep one's per-
sonal communications private. For the purposes of this discussion that
right is broader than stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts but
independent of any rights that may accrue under copyright law. In-
deed, copyright law may mean reliance on protection that is arguably
inappropriate and overly narrow.
C. Some Questions to Consider
Having offered a case for the privacy of letters, there are a number
of complications that arise from a focus on the letter writer's "peace of
7 See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1266 (1999); see also United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123
(9th Cir. 2010) (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
7 See Adam Cohen, The Government Can Use GPS to Track Your Moves, TIME, Aug. 25,
2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,20131 5 0,00.html.
7 See IMMANUE. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAIs AND WHAT IS
ENLIGHTENMENT? (Lewis White Beck trans., 2d ed. rev. 1990) (1785); see asoJEFFRIE G.
MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIcHT 57-65 (1970); Alan H. Goldman, Rights, Utili-
ties and Contracts, in NEW ESSAYS ON CONTRACT THEORY 131 (Kai Nielsen & Roger A.
Shiner eds., 1977).
76 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONOMIcS 19 n.2 (2002).
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mind." To understand the first concern, consider the factual asser-
tions that may be found in a letter-"after visiting the store I met
Marge and we made love." Under copyright law, facts are not pro-
tected, although their expression may be. Should a letter writer be
able to protect truthful facts? In a sense, the idea is unattractive. The
writer does not "own" the facts. On the other hand, unless there is a
compelling reason, as noted above," there is little reason not to pro-
tect the writer's communication of facts the writer knows and others
do not."
An additional question is how long does one "own" his or her pri-
vacy. In copyright, because a work is regarded as comparable to tradi-
tional property, it is an asset that can be passed from generation to
generation as though it were the family farm. 9 Privacy, as defined
here, is not an income-earning asset. In fact, one could argue that the
letter writer can only enjoy peace of mind as long as he or she is mind-
ful. At death, so the argument would go, the interest in privacy ends.
One argument for this approach is that it actually may make letters
more available to others once the letter writer dies. Those who prefer
a copyright approach because it holds open the potential of fair use
access may find they are in a better position if the peace of mind inter-
est ends with the death of the letter writer. There are two qualifica-
tions that should, however, enter into this analysis. First, suppose the
facts and views found in a letter would infringe on the peace of mind
of a third party. For example, in the letter involving Marge, suppose
she does not want the letter to be read because of fear that it will upset
Homer. Second, there is the possibility that the knowledge that the
letter will be available for reading when one dies causes a loss of peace
of mind to the writer while living.
Both of these possibilities counsel for more extensive protection
than the life of the writer. The first, third party impacts, is more com-
pelling because the third party has a privacy interest and the revelation
of information can have a distinct negative impact. Less compelling is
the extension of protection beyond the life of the author when the
77 These are instances in which knowledge of the letters could lead to avoiding the
harm to others.
7 In this sense a privacy interest in letters is more expansive than what would be
offered under copyright law.
7 Of course, the life plus 70 years rule for duration means that the actual period
during which internalization is permitted can vary greatly and seems disconnected from
an economic rationale.
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only interest is the author's peace of mind. In these cases, a bright line
test should be sufficient, with the letter writer's understanding at the
time of writing that all will be fair game in the future. Knowing the
rule means the letter writer can account for today's peace of mind with
respect to after-death uses when deciding what to write today.
There is a further consideration that shadows either of the above
approaches. When rights are assigned there must be a method of pro-
tecting those rights. The conventional way of thinking about protect-
ing rights, as expressed in the seminal work by Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamad,80 is to consider whether they are best protected by a
"property rule" or a "liability rule."8' Under a property rule, a right
may not be taken without permission.82 In effect, a property rule en-
courages a voluntary exchange, typically at a price agreed upon by the
parties.8 3 Liability rules require payment of damages after the fact.8 4
For a number of reasons, including both the importance of consent
and the comparison of relative value when determining price,"5 prop-
erty rules are preferable unless transaction costs are so high that they
preclude a mutually beneficial exchange.8 6 When transaction costs are
high, liability rules become the only option.87
Copyright law's remedy of damages plus disgorgement of profits
earned by the infringer create what is in essence a property rule by (in
theory) eliminating any gain from use of a work without permission.88
In the context of letters, a property rule also seems appropriate. First,
in the context of letters, transaction costs are relatively low. The recipi-
ent of the letter as well as the writer is identifiable. In fact, if the au-
80 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamad, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. RE4v. 1089 (1972).
81 See id. at 1092 (introducing the "property rule" and "liability rule" as ways to pro-
tect rights).
82 See id. (noting that "[a]n entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from
him in a voluntary transaction").
8 See id. (recognizing that a "property rule" encourages a voluntary exchange "in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller").
84 See id. at 1106-09 (demonstrating how payment under a "liability nle" operates
through the examples of eminent domain and accidents).
85 See HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 71, at 93-95.
86 See id.
87 Another possibility, a rule of inalienability, seems inapplicable in this context.
88 In essence, it eliminates the possibility of what has been called "efficient infringe-
ment." An efficient infringement would occur if an infringer could earn enough to
fully compensate the owner of the work for his or her loss and still experience a net
gain. See Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1994).
2012] 177
178 Elon Law Review [Vol. 3: 161
thor is not identifiable (and transaction costs high), the peace of mind
justification becomes irrelevant. Probably more important is that
property rules protect subjective values. For example, in the case of a
liability rule of damages to real property, an award equal to fair market
value arguably restores the plaintiff to the ex ante position. On the
other hand, the damage to one's peace of mind cannot be valued with-
out the input of the individual involved. The valuation point is before
the harm occurs.89
A final and very important point involves the intersection of pri-
vacy rights and the First Amendment. One way to avoid the problem
involves an analysis that is possibly too cute. The peace of mind at
issue when it comes to letters is connected to the reading of private
communications, not the dissemination. While this is technically true,
the writer's peace of mind is not so much related to a single reader but
to the broad dissemination of the information. This does raise First
Amendment concerns. In the field of copyright law, the First Amend-
ment question is arguably satisfied by noting the distinction between
ideas (not protected) and expression (protected) and the fair use op-
portunity.9 0 These measures are found within the Copyright Act
itself.9'
The problem is whether one can detach letters from copyright law
and still claim that the protection of letters as discussed here will pass
First Amendment muster. This is well-traveled ground,1 and the con-
flict is obvious but perhaps not as severe as it may initially appear. In
fact, there are powerful arguments that privacy interests in letters do
not invoke the values associated with free speech. I do not intend to
summarize the arguments and the literature here other than to note a
few factors that are particular to letters. First, it should be noted, that
the privacy requirement is not wholly separable from the right not to
speak. The letter writer prefers not to make the communication pub-
lic or have it expressed publically-while the intruder wants to commu-
89 Criminal law may come into play when individuals attempt to change property
rules to liability rules. See Calabresi & Melamad, supra note 80, at 1124-27.
'o Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-22.
9117 U.S.C. §g 102(b), 107 (2006).
92 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1012-13 (1996); Sean M. Scott, The
Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. Rtv. 683, 723 (1996); Daniel J.
Solove, The Virtues of KnowingLess: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DuKE
L.J. 967, 967 (2003); Lorelei Van Wey, Private Facts Tort: The End is Here, 52 OHIo ST. L.J.
299, 299-300 (1991).
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nicate. Nevertheless, the content of that expression is dependent on
the letter writer and thus any rights claimed by the repeater are argua-
bly subordinate to those of the writer without whom there would be
nothing to communicate.
Closely related to this is the question of the impact of reducing
the privacy of letters. Almost certainly it means fewer letters. People
will keep to themselves, speak rather than write, and destroy records.
Images of disappearing ink and self-destructing messages come to
mind. The effect is permanent. In a very real sense, the ability to have
writings to reflect upon and speak about in the future may be a func-
tion of the privacy afforded today. Obviously, there is no empirical
evidence to examine on this point, but quite clearly one cannot reduce
the privacy of letters and expect there to be no impact. Moreover,
under the proposal offered here, there is no privacy in communica-
tions that have a serious impact on the welfare of others. In addition,
unlike copyright, peace of mind and the resulting privacy interests re-
quire that the author possess the capacity to be mindful. Thus, privacy
can play an important role in encouraging more information and
greater diversity of expression.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Everyone from the love sick teenager to the college professor who
misaddresses an email would prefer to have his or her privacy in letters
observed. Technological changes mean it is increasingly difficult to
assure that privacy. With a click of a button a letter can be dissemi-
nated worldwide and a life changed permanently. There is a tendency
to think about copyright law and the right to first publication when
considering the privacy of letters. The point made here is that letters
should not be copyrighted. Copyright is largely based on the opposite
of privacy. It stems from a belief that authors should be permitted to
internalize the benefits of their works when disseminated. Letter writ-
ers do not want to internalize; for the most part they desire the peace
of mind associated with avoiding disclosure and intrusion.
This means that privacy interests are more relevant than copy-
right-like property interests. This article argues that there are moral or
economic bases for supporting the privacy of letters as long as the in-
formation therein does not reveal a serious danger to the welfare of
others. It also suggests that the "peace of mind" rationale, with limited
exception, ends with the letter writer's life. This solution may be supe-
rior for both privacy seekers and for those who have concerns about
the availability of information and a diversity of expression.
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